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Nepal: The End of Shangri-La
Julia Chang Bloch*

Democracy proponents face unpalatable choices, and there is no clear path
towards resolving the conundrum. The royal coup, however, was not the
best option. The Maoists have survived and strengthened because of the
disarray among the democratic parties. What the King could have done
was to lead the political parties into a united front to pursue peace with the
Maoists. Now, he has completely sidelined the parties, going it alone,
possibly allowing the Maoists to play one against the other and gain the
upper hand.

Nepal is not often in the news, but when it is, the headlines cry out
with a vengeance. The last time I was asked to speak about Nepal was in
2001, right after the unspeakable tragedy, when crown prince Dipendra
Bir Bikram Shah Dev went on a rampage and killed practically the entire
royal family of Nepal -- nine family members in all.
Nepal is headline news once again. On February 1, 2005, Nepal’s
King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev abolished the country’s 15 year
experiment with democracy and restored absolute monarchy. For the
second time in less than three years, the King dismissed the multiparty
government, declared a state of emergency, suspended fundamental
constitutional rights, and placed the country’s political leaders and
activists under house arrest or in jail.
*
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What has gone so desperately wrong with Nepal?
In a way the 2001 tragedy and the 2005 royal coup are connected.
Gyanendra ascended the throne because he was practically the only royal
left alive. Less popular than his brother, the slain king, he has been tainted
by wild suspicions of conspiracy theorists who blame him for the
massacre even though he was miles away at the royal retreat in Pokhara on
the night it happened.
No amount of evidence, however official, can remove the doubts,
speak the unspeakable, and answer the unanswerable. Why? What had
triggered Crown Prince Dipendra's murderous attack? Should Nepalis
honor Dipendra as the 12th king of the Shah dynasty (Dipendra, in a coma,
ascended the throne when his father died and was king for less than 48
hours)? Or should they remember him as a regicide, matricide, fratricide,
and suicide?
There are no answers to Dipendra’s actions. But Gyanendra’s
seizure of power for the monarchy, while regrettable, is more
understandable.
Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, there have been ten
governments, not counting the three King Gyanendra appointed and
dismissed. Incessant squabbling among the political parties, rampant
corruption among practically all sectors of society, recurring palace
intrigues, and a growing Maoist insurgency going into its ninth year have
brought Nepal to the brink of becoming a failed state. The death of King
Birendra, who had come to be seen as a symbol of stability, shattered the
spirit and hope of his people creating a void, which his brother King
Gyanendra has not been able to fill.
Until the tragedy and the recent royal coup, Nepal enjoyed a
romanticized obscurity. It was best known as Shangri-la, the mythic
kingdom created by James Hilton in the 1930's book of that fabled name.
Some 25,000-30,000 Americans visited every year, finding Shangri-la in
the country’s soaring natural beauty --the indomitable Himalayan
mountains-- its remote villages, gentle people, and mystical temples, all
familiar through the pages of the National Geographic or a best seller like
Into Thin Air.
Aside from a tourist destination, Nepal does not usually figure in
the world's consciousness. Most Americans think too little of Asia; when
they do, South Asia does not usually come to mind. When there is any
thought about the subcontinent, it usually goes no further than India and
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Pakistan. Nepal, one of the oldest states of South Asia, historically and
politically is almost a complete blank to most Americans.
I don’t want you to know Nepal only through the prism of Shangrila or the royal massacre or this latest royal coup. Let us make something
useful out of Nepal's many calamities. It will give me an opportunity to
tell you what I know about this Himalayan kingdom, -- why we
Americans should care what happens in this far away land and why we
should help Nepal return from the abyss.

My Nepal
Nepal is a sliver of remarkable land, 120 miles wide and 700 miles
long, encompassing every type of ecosystem known on earth, from steamy
rain forest and fetid swamp to arid desert and the blue ice glaciers of the
world's highest mountains. With approximately 27 million people
crammed into borders only slightly larger than the state of Tennessee,
Nepal sits at the very core of half the world's population, surrounded by
the world's two most populous nations - China to its north and India to its
south.
Dating to the mid-18th century, when Prithvi Narayan Shah unified
the country and established the Shah dynasty, the Nepali monarchy has
lasted to this day with King Gyanendra being its 13th hereditary monarch.
However, for more than a century, from 1848 to 1951, power resided with
the hereditary Rana prime ministers, who shut the kingdom off from the
rest of the world to avoid the onslaught of colonialism. A popular
revolution in 1951 overthrew the century-old rule of the Ranas, restored
the power of the monarchy, which began a ten-year experiment with
government of common people including a multi-party democracy that
lasted until 1960, when King Mahendra, father of the current king, staged
a royal coup which terminated the government headed by the Nepali
Congress Party. King Gyanendra‘s recent actions mirrored those of his
father.
King Mahendra devised the so-called partyless panchayat system,
under which political parties were banned, all organizations had to be
registered with the government, and the palace both ruled and reigned, a
situation that lasted until April 1990.
For another three decades – between 1960-1990 – Nepal was again
isolated from the world's political mainstream. Panchayat rule, however,
did foster economic changes. Aid donors, led by the United States in the
sixties, contributed much to opening roads, introducing electricity,
3
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building a university, sending thousands of Nepalis for advanced training,
modernizing the civil service, helping Nepal in countless ways to make up
for its long slumber.
During the cold war Nepal, again captive of its geography became
a center of intrigue -- a listening post for the great powers. Its border with
Tibet also made it a base for the Khampas to mount their heroic but
doomed resistance against Chinese communist rule of their homeland.
Today, one of the U.N.-designated least developed countries (#33,
2004), Nepal relies on foreign assistance for about 70 percent of its
development budget, with the bulk coming from the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank, but also from a large number of bilateral donors
and non-governmental organizations (NGO's).
I arrived in Kathmandu in September 1989, in retrospect no better
time for an ambassador because it was such a momentous period in
Nepal’s history – its transformation from absolute monarchy to multiparty democracy.
I was also immediately introduced to Nepal's vulnerablities,
particularly its considerable dependence on good relations with India. A
landlocked country, its trade access depends on a 500-mile corridor
through India to the port of Calcutta. At the time of my arrival, those ties
were all but snapped in a dispute, and India closed all but one transit point,
causing highly negative consequences for the Nepalese economy. The
embassy and I also suffered, as my household effects and embassy
provisions were long delayed.
So, I was often reminded of the first Shah king's advice to his heirs
when in the 1780's he warned Nepal always to steer a middle path between
the two giant powers to the north and to the south. King Prithvi Narayan
Shah called Nepal "a yam caught between two giant stones". The king's
advice has defined the parameters of Nepal's foreign policy to this day;
strains with India always led to reminders of the need to keep ties with
New Delhi in good order.
I was also able to witness the waning days of an absolute
monarchy, as well as its panchayat controls and narrow range of
permissible discourse, especially about political alternatives to a partyless
system.

Revolution and Democracy
Beginning in January 1990, events began to move swiftly. Shaking
off 30 years in the cold, years of imprisonment or exile for many, disunity
4
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among themselves, opposition politicians belonging to the banned parties
were greatly impressed by the profound changes in Eastern Europe Romania in particular. Inspired by the rising international tide demanding
respect for human rights around the world, they began to insist that their
time had come too.
Led by Ganesh Man Singh, the then-75-year-old leader of the
Nepali Congress, the underground political parties agreed to set aside
historic differences in ideology and unite to launch a highly orchestrated,
cooperative, multi-party movement for democracy. Seven communist
parties and the larger, centrist Nepali Congress party would combine their
efforts in a concerted attempt to topple the government. And they would
succeed.
These leaders had no delusions about long-term unanimity. The
alliance for democracy was a revolutionary marriage of convenience, a
temporary liaison for the most concrete of political ends: the abolition of
the panchayat system and the establishment of multi-party democracy.
Beginning on January 18, 1990, the protests began. In retrospect, it
was inevitable. But when it was happening, no one, including the
revolutionaries themselves, thought success would come or come so
quickly. What the democracy movement wanted at first was only the right
for political parties to participate in elections.
Instead, the movement caught the imagination and support of the
people. The protests grew in size and intensity and increasingly focused on
the one man with the power to change the government: then-King
Birendra Bikram Shah, the central symbol of sovereignty and national
identity for the Kingdom of Nepal. On April 6, more than 50,000 marched
toward the palace. Armed police protecting the perimeter opened fire.
Dozens died and the city was clamped under martial law.
Then, on April 9, 1990, with the nation seething in fury at the
killings, King Birendra made the boldest decision of his reign: he
abolished the partyless panchayat system, legalized political parties,
appointed an interim prime minister and invited the coalition of left and
center parties to form an interim cabinet.
Forever etched in my mind are pictures of the jubilation of the
people. Celebrations swept the cities and towns. In the hills and villages,
farmers and factory workers gathered around radios to listen again and
again to the impossible news: democracy had returned to Nepal.
At first, exhilaration and fantasy overwhelmed the Nepalese
people. To many, with only the haziest of notions about representative
government, democracy was the right to whatever they wanted and had
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always deserved, like a doubling of wages, a new boss, an end to
corruption, cheaper goods and a proud place in the international arena.
With remarkable rapidity and order, the new political leaders,
many of whom only recently emerged from years in prison, exile or
underground, promulgated a new democratic constitution, defined a
constitutional role for their monarch, and set the stage for the first national
multi-party election in over 30 years.
That historic election, held in May, 1991, and judged “free and
fair” by international observers, put the Congress Party in power with a
comfortable majority in parliament and gave the United Marxist-Leninist
Party (CPN-UML), the largest of the communist parties, sufficient seats to
serve as a strong opposition.
I still remember my conversations with the US delegation of
election observers, debating whether Nepal, a country with a per capita
income at the time of less than $200 a year, could sustain a democratic
political system. Caught up in the euphoria at the time, we were full of
hope. But we also recognized that whether democracy gains legitimacy or
not in poor countries depends largely on how effectively their
governments deal with the crushing poverty. Democracy, after all, is not
just about constitutions and elections. It is also about a better life.

Nepal's Democratic Experience
Soon enough, the obstacles against democracy taking root in Nepal
became apparent. The Nepali government faced the same challenges as the
Russians, East Europeans, and Central Asians -- whether democracy could
liberalize the economy, establish the rule of law, protect individual rights,
and give the people a better, more secure life.
I recall one incident when the interim government reduced
subsidies, increased electricity and telephone rates, moved toward full
convertability of its rupee, and committed itself to privatization and
administrative reform in order to rationalize its economy in the long term.
But in the short term prices went up and the cost of living for the urban
middle class skyrocketed. Consequently, ignited by protest demonstrations
led by the communist left, the people's long-standing economic
frustrations erupted in violence, and seven people were reportedly killed
with many more injured. A curfew helped to restore order, but the
government had to back down on the reforms. Such incidents would recur
again and again to plague Nepal's democracy.
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Although the trend is clear, and economies throughout the world
are liberalizing, Nepal's experience is symptomatic of the dilemma facing
all democracies, particularly the poor ones. Fareed Zakaria points out in
his important new book, The Future of Freedom, that almost every
democratic success in the developing world in the past fifty years has
taken place under a liberal authoritarian regime. Like in Nepal, regimes
that take up democratic reforms, he notes, find themselves “stymied by the
need to maintain subsidies for politically powerful groups.”
Democracy depends on the consent of the governed, and its
government must reflect the will of the people. What people want,
however, is not always what is good for them. And all politicians, who
depend on an electorate for their positions, will be reluctant to pursue
unpopular policies, no matter how wise or necessary.
As I left Nepal in May, 1993, I wondered how much time the
Nepalis would give their government to deliver on the goods expected of a
democracy. Nepalis had expected a better life with the advent of
democracy. Instead, prices went up, the rupee was devalued, jobs were
more uncertain; demonstrations and strikes disrupted the economy and
everyday life; and corruption was rampant. And with each tentative step
towards economic liberalization, Nepalis found their lives not better, only
less predictable, and relief was nowhere in sight.
It seemed that the deck was stacked against the Nepalis. They
would not be able to overcome the weight of democracy’s history. As
political scientists Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongu found when
they studied all countries between the years 1950 and 1990: in a
democratic country that has a per capita income of under $1,500, the
regime on average had a life expectancy of just 8 years. Only when the per
capita income is above $6,000 did it become highly resilient.
Given the Przeworski and Limongu scale, Nepal actually has done
well. While its per capita income is far below $1,500, its democracy
survived over 10 years (Gyanendra first dismissed a democratically
elected government in 2001).
But since the triumphant days of the interim government, there has
been a succession of weak governments, few lasting more than a year;
constant bickering among the political parties; infighting within both the
ruling and opposition parties; instability and insecurity in people’s daily
lives; and disruptions and ineptitude in making economic progress. The
Nepali people, not surprisingly, have grown increasingly dissatisfied and
cynical.
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The Maoist Insurgency
Early in 1996, the legal Maoist party, the Communist Party of
Nepal (CPN Maoist) abandoned parliament and declared a “People’s War”
against the state. Using terror tactics, including murder, bombings, torture,
intimidation, and extortion, Maoist activists launched their insurgency in
five hill districts -- Rolpa, Rukum, and Jajarkot in the Mid-West, Gorkha
in the West, and Sindhuli in the East.
The Maoists, of course, are strongest in the poorest areas. Their
masses of supporters are illiterate men and women, in large numbers from
the non-Hindu ethnic castes known as Janajatis, attracted by promises of
change in the village feudal land structure. Women, often the poorest of
the poor, reportedly comprise one third of those drawn to the guerrilla
forces.
The insurgency feeds on poverty, discontent with repressive
policies, corruption, and the loss of hope. I have walked the hills of Nepal
and seen its poverty. Many villages are still living in the medieval ages,
without schools, roads, electricity, or medical facilities, and ignored by the
politicans in Kathmandu. There is little domestic capital to invest and even
less foreign investment. Development aid often never reaches those who
need it most.
While economic growth is averaging 4 percent per year for the past
several years, it is insufficient to absorb the estimated 500,000 young
people who join the labor force each year. When I was ambassador, I
spoke to scores of rural youths, who fail high school examinations each
year. They don’t have jobs or futures and are easy prey for the armed
Maoist guerrilla forces.
At the start of the insurgency, the government treated the Maoist
war as a law and order problem to be contained by police operations.
Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, have charged that
the police have killed more innocent civilians than guerrillas.
In almost all battles between the police and Maoist guerrillas, the
insurgents have proved their military mettle if not superiority. As the war
has progressed, it has become increasingly clear that neither side has the
military muscle to win decisively. The Maoist can blockade Kathmandu,
cutting off the capital for a few days, but they cannot maintain the
stranglehold. But government forces cannot contain this insurgency
because the Maoists have grown from a small rag tag group of guerillas to
a fighting force that is now estimated to be 15,000 strong.
The Maoists also have gained support and a social base. They have
formed provisional governments in seven districts, where they are raising
8
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taxes, dispensing guerrilla justice, maintaining security. Maoists now
reportedly control 40 percent of Nepal, or 30 of the country’s 75 districts.
In its nine years the insurgency has claimed 11,000 lives, 5,000
having been killed in the last two years. And the lives of roughly twothirds of the 24 million people of Nepal are estimated to have been
directly affected.
The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN Maoist) has become an
undeniable political as well as military force. Military action alone will not
eliminate it.

Who Are the Maoists?
The Maoist insurgency needs to be understood in light of the
history of the communist movement in Nepal, which began in 1949, when
Pushpa Lal Shrestha formed the Communist Party of Nepal. It emerged as
an intellectual opposition to the Nepali Congress Party’s policy of
compromise with the monarchy and with India. Its ideology, however, was
always murky even during the days of absolute monarchy. At one point,
Nepal had as many as nineteen communist parties. The factions could not
agree who was their main enemy --domestic feudalism led by the king, or
the Nepali Congress, seen as surrogates for an allegedly expansionist India
and an imperialist west.
Many of the Maoists worked alongside mainstream political parties
in overthrowing Nepal’s absolute monarchy in 1990. They also
participated in the country’s first parliamentary elections. In the 1994
elections, the United Marxist Leninist Party (UML) defeated the Nepali
Congress Party, and Nepal got the first communist government in a
constitutional monarchy. The UML-led government, however, excluded
one communist faction from participation, which led to its withdrawal
from the political process. The rest is history.
While Maoist leaders have said in interviews that they emulate the
Shining Path of Peru. Donald Camp, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for South Asia, testified before the House International Relations
Committee and likened the Maoists to the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. He
told the committee that the Maoists have made clear their intention to
impose a one-party "people's republic,” collectivize agriculture and
“reeducate” class enemies. In either case, the humanitarian nightmare of
such a regime would be too horrible to contemplate.
In the final analysis, Nepal's communist movement is home grown.
They have taken Mao’s name, but there is no Chinese money or support.
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In fact, Maoist leaders call today’s Chinese leaders “counterrevolutionaries.” The insurgency feeds on popular discontent in the
country, and its growth can be seen as a failure of mainstream politics to
meet the needs and aspirations of the country’s poor. In a country where
80 percent of the people depend on subsistence agriculture; 40 percent
lack access to basic healthcare and education; 44 percent are illiterate, and
42 percent earn less than $100 per year, discontent is endemic.

Testing the theories of democracy
Nepal’s democracy has not lived up to its promise. For Nepalis,
particularly the poor, democracy has lost its luster and is fast losing its
legitimacy. The mixed response to King Gyanendra’s coup is a reflection
of a frustrated Nepali populace. Letters and emails from Nepali friends
indicate that many, in fact, welcomed the King’s actions as the last best
chance to defeat the Maoists and restore a semblance of stability to the
country, while others condemn the royal power grab as a death knell to
democracy, benefitting the Maoists.
While the major powers have condemned King Gyanendra’s coup,
they have not stopped all aid. Two days after the royal takeover, the Asian
Development Bank signed a 1.8 billion rupees ($26 million) loan
agreement with the government. While Britain and India have suspended
their military aid, the US has only frozen an expansion of its military aid.
At the same time, Japan announced it would extend $17 million in aid to
Nepal for food and development assistance. Although some countries,
notably Norway, have drastically cut their assistance, donors face a
dilemma – withholding support for the King could strengthen the Maoists,
but continuing support could kill efforts to restore democracy.
At a time when democracy has no rivals as a political system,
when US President George W. Bush has dubbed democracy the best
antidote to terrorism, Nepal seems to be out of step, moving backward into
an anachronistic past.
Nepal, however, presents a lesson on the questions that political
philosophers have addressed since Rousseau and de Tocqueville: what
conditions make democracy possible, and what conditions make it thrive?
And why do so many developing countries have so much difficulty
creating stable and democratic societies.
Many theses for democratization have been suggested by the
historical growth of democracy in western countries. Most of these are
culture-bound, maintaining that democracy can thrive only in rich
10
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countries or western countries. Social scientist Seymour Martin Lipset
wrote as early as 1959: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater its
chances to sustain democracy.” And no less a foreign policy savant than
George Kennan believed that democracy is appropriate only for
northwestern and perhaps central European countries and their colonial
offshoots. The skeptics of democracy's prospects are legion and come
from all points of the political spectrum.
Fareed Zakaria’s sobering analysis in his new book has confirmed
the skepticism, challenging the conventional thinking about democracy,
including the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Close to half of the “democratizing” countries in the world are
illiberal democracies.
Newly democratic countries too often become sham democracies,
which produces disenchantment, disarray, violence and new forms
of tyranny.
Most Pakistanis were happy to be rid of eleven years of sham
democracy.
Hong Kong was a small but revealing illustration that liberty did
not depend on democracy.
The best-consolidated democracies in Latin America and East Asia
–Chile, South Korea, and Taiwan– were for a long while ruled by
military juntas.
The introduction of democracy in divided societies has actually
fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict and even war.

However, Zakaria concludes, “…democracy, with all its flaws, represents
the “last best hope” for people around the world.
I couldn’t agree more with this point, as I am personally a
beneficiary of America’s democracy, having been a refugee from China as
a child. I have always believed that democracy is the best guarantee of
individual liberty and world peace. And I also have believed that there is
no better objective of American foreign policy than the promotion of
freedom, to spread the benefits of a democratic society. As America’s
ambassador to Nepal, I felt the power of America’s democratic values in
Nepal’s democratization.
Twelve years later, I am holding on to the last shreds of hope that
democracy in Nepal is not dead.
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Conclusion
King Gyanendra took an enormous gamble when he fired the
Cabinet, declared a state of emergency and assumed power. He said he
wanted stability first and democracy second. But the challenge he faces is
daunting: find peace with the Maoists, organise elections and reestablish
democracy in three years as he has promised.
If his gamble pays off and a sustainable peace is negotiated, King
Gyanendra will have done a great service to his country. His success,
however, may strengthen the monarchy to the detriment of democracy,
possibly returning Nepal to an absolute monarchy, as the King may not
willingly give up his powers and allow a return to parliamentary
democracy.
If he fails to bring an end to the insurgency, as many predict, it
could mean the end of the monarchy, as he will have no one to blame but
himself. Moreover, he risks turning Nepal into a failed state, possibly
putting the Maoist in power and repeating the totalitarianism that once
devasted Cambodia. And if Nepal becomes a failed state, it could become
another Afghanistan, providing a sanctuary for terrorists.
If somehow the coup could be reversed and democracy restored,
Nepal is not likely to be able to solve its problems. The parties might be
willing to come together in opposition to the king’s dismissal of their
power, but they will undoubtedly return to squabbling once their power is
restored.
Democracy proponents face unpalatable choices, and there is no
clear path towards resolving the conundrum. The royal coup, however,
was not the best option. The Maoists have survived and strengthened
because of the disarray among the democratic parties. What the King
could have done was to lead the political parties into a united front to
pursue peace with the Maoists. Now, he has completely sidelined the
parties, going it alone, possibly allowing the Maoists to play one against
the other and gain the upper hand.
While democratic governments must maintain pressure on King
Gyanendra to restore democracy to Nepal, the over-riding issue in Nepal’s
crisis is to bring an end to the insurgency and restore peace to the country.
Democracy without security is meaningless.
There is much at stake in saving Nepal from collapse and misery.
Its geography once again defines its importance geopolitically. India and,
now Bangladesh, have their own Maoist rebels, who operate largely in the
unstable regions bordering Nepal. Should the Maoists succeed in Nepal, it
would embolden their brethrens in neighboring countries. Nepal also
12
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borders Tibet, and China worries that further instability in Nepal could
spread unrest east, or even north into China’s restive Xinjiang region.
The major powers cannot afford Nepal becoming a failed state.
They need to push for a resolution of this crisis, including a possible UN
role if all else fails.
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